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I. Introduction
Hundreds of thousands of people have lost or been denied Social
Security Disability Insurance and Supplemental Security Income
disability benefits (SSD)I in the last few years, as the Reagan Admin-
istration has endeavored to clear the disability rolls of people who
are not disabled.2 In response, tens of thousands of actions have
been filed by individual SSD claimants, as well as hundreds of class
actions, challenging the legality of the denial and termination proce-
dures3 utilized by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. 4
t The author wishes to thank Lewis Golinker of New York Lawyers for the Public
Interest for his assistance in the preparation of this Comment.
1. The definition of disability is similar for disability determinations under Social
Security Disability Insurance, Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 416(i)
(1982), and under Supplemental Security Income, Title XVI of the Social Security Act,
42 U.S.C. § 1382(c) (1982). This Comment will not distinguish between the two.
2. Yohalem, Social Security Disability Insurance and SS1: The Chronically Mentally Ill Face
Arbitrary Cutoff, 16 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 998, 998-99 (1985); Weinstein, Equality and the
Law: Social Security Disability Cases in the Federal Courts, 35 SYRACUSE L. REV. 897, 912-13
(1984); N.Y. Times, May 19, 1982, at BI, col. 5; N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1985, at A30, col.
1; Note, Terminating Social Security Disability Benefits: Another Burden for the Disabled? 12
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 195, 196-98, 198 n.19 (1983).
3. Procedural challenges to both termination decisions and denial of initial applica-
tions seek to invalidate the Social Security Administration's (SSA) methods of determin-
ing whether claimants' disabilities are covered by the Social Security Act. Plaintiffs in
such challenges allege that the SSA has violated the Constitution, statutes or the SSA's
regulations in reaching the unfavorable decision. See, e.g., Schisler v. Heckler, 107
F.R.D. 609 (W.D.N.Y. 1984), appeal docketed, No. 85-6092/6096 (2d Cir. Mar. 20, 1985)
(Secretary's abandonment of standard of "medical improvement" before terminating
benefits violates due process clause, Social Security Act and SSA regulations); Dixon v.
Heckler, 589 F. Supp. 1494 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), appeal docketed, No. 84-6288 (2d Cir. Sept.
25, 1984) (Secretary's "severity" standard for determining disability violates Social Se-
curity Act).
4. Recognizing that the human suffering caused by SSD denials and terminations
had reached tragic proportions, Congress passed the Social Security Disability Benefits
Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-460, 98 Stat. 1794 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Re-
form Act], setting forth detailed guidelines for the disability determination process.
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These actions raise the crucial threshold question of whether federal
courts have jurisdiction in the absence of timely exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies. To resolve this issue, courts balance the
claimant's need for judicial review against the Secretary's interest in
completing administrative review. In balancing these interests,
courts address the separation of powers between the judiciary and
the Social Security Administration. 5
The Social Security Act, § 405(g)6, provides federal courts with
subject matter jurisdiction, permitting SSD claimants to challenge
"final" decisions of the Secretary regarding entitlement to benefits. 7
The Secretary's regulations establish four stages of administrative
review for reaching a "final" decision 8 and require the claimant to
This legislation was designed to resolve the "chaos" plaguing the administration of
SSD, as courts consistently held that the Secretary's procedures violated the Social Se-
curity Act. See comments of Representatives and Senators in support of the bill, 130
CONG. REC. H9834-37, S 11453-64 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1984).
5. The separation of powers principle posits that separate branches of government,
i.e. the legislature, executive and judiciary, should perform the distinct tasks of legisla-
tion, administration and adjudication, respectively. This approach recognizes that these
tasks overlap and therefore permits the delegation of powers among the branches. See,
e.g., Aranson, Gellhorn and Robinson, A Theory of Legislative Delegation, 68 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 3-4 (1982). Under a separation of powers approach, administrative agencies of
the executive branch are authorized to implement and interpret the laws, while the com-
plementary, distinct role of the courts is to resolve disputes by stating what the law is,
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), and by ensuring that administrative
agencies obey constitutional and statutory mandates. See 1 K. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAw TREATISE § 1.09, at 68-69 (1958); Note, Congressional Preclusion of Judicial Review of
Federal Benefit Disbursement: Reasserting Separation of Powers, 97 HARV. L. REV. 778 (1984).
But cf. , J. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE 193 (1983) (courts unsuited to administrative
adjudication).
6. Section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, Title 42 U.S.C. § 4 05(g) (1982) reads in
pertinent part: Any individual, after any final decision of the Secretary made after a
hearing to which he was a party, irrespective of the amount in controversy, may obtain a
review of such decision by a civil action commenced within sixty days after the mailing to
him of notice of such decision or within such further time as the Secretary may allow.
7. Section 4 05(g) of the Social Security Act is the basis for the judicial holding that
timely exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite for subject matter jurisdic-
tion. Mathews v.-Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 327 (1976). Section 2(d) of the Reform Act
exempts from the requirement of timely exhaustion those class actions initiated before
passage of the bill in which claimants alleged that the Secretary did not consider medical
improvement in terminating disability. Section 2(d) of the Reform Act explicitly left to
district courts the task of defining the scope of class actions in medical improvement
cases for claimants whose benefits were terminated. This provision therefore immunizes
these lawsuits from the jurisdictional bars contained in § 4 05(g), specifically exhaustion
of administrative remedies within sixty days of the mailing of notice. See Kuehner v.
Heckler, No. 85-1227, slip. op. at 15, 21 (3d Cir. Dec. 9, 1985); Avery v. Heckler, 762
F.2d 158, 163 (1st Cir. 1985). See also H.R. REP. No. 1039, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 27
(1984); 130 CONG. REC. S11454 (daily ed. Sept. 19, 1984) (remarks of Senator Dole).
However, other claims raised within the same class actions, e.g. allegations of improper
determinations of disability for initial applications for benefits, are not so exempted. See
Hyatt v. Heckler, 757 F.2d 1455, 1460 (4th Cir. 1985), petition for cert. filed, 54 U.S.L.W.
3229 (U.S. Sept. 19, 1985) (No. 85-474).




appeal each unfavorable administrative decision within sixty days of
the mailing of notice to the claimant. 9
Many claimants who are denied benefits due to the Secretary's
utilization of allegedly illegal procedures do not pursue the avail-
able administrative appeals.' 0 Some file challenges in district court
instead of exhausting administrative remedies. Others drop out of
the appeals process, failing to challenge the Secretary's decision,
but may be drawn into litigation as unnamed plaintiffs. Claimants
who do not exhaust administrative remedies and/or are time-barred
from pursuing administrative appeals cannot obtain judicial review
under § 4 05(g), unless courts waive the exhaustion and/or sixty-day
requirements. I
The Supreme Court is currently reviewing waiver of administra-
tive exhaustion and the sixty-day rule by lower courts in Heckler v.
City of New York,1 2 a case challenging the Secretary's determinations
of the ability of mentally impaired claimants to perform basic work
activities. In City of New York, the Secretary had circulated memo-
randa throughout the agency which required administrators at the
first two stages of administrative review to follow an unpublished
procedure for determining claimants' ability to work. The district
court held that the unpublished procedure constituted a "covert
policy" which violated both the Social Security Act and the agency
ual receives an adverse decision (denial or termination of benefits), the second step is an
appeal requesting "reconsideration." Third, an unfavorable reconsideration decision
may be appealed to an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). Fourth, if the ALJ does not
grant benefits, this decision may be appealed to the Appeals Council. See 20 C.F.R.
§ 404.900 (1985). See also, Weinstein, supra, note 2, at 907-09.
9. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.909, .933, .968, .981.
10. For example, New York State officials estimated that in 1982 one-third of the
claimants whose benefits were terminated applied for reconsideration, and of these 12
percent had their terminations cancelled. One-third of the claimants who were denied
benefits at the reconsideration stage requested a hearing before an ALJ, of whom ap-
proximately half won reinstatement. N.Y. Times, May 19, 1982, at BI, col. 5.
11. Claimants who cannot obtain review under § 405(g) may have no access to the
courts. The Supreme Court has held that neither federal question jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1331 nor jurisdiction under § 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.
§ 553 apply to denials of SSD benefits. Heckler v. Ringer, 104 S. Ct. 2013 (1984) (deny-
ing federal question jurisdiction); Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977) (denying ju-
risdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act); Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749
(1975) (denying federal question jurisdiction). The Court has not decided whether
mandamus jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1361 may be utilized for SSD claims. Ringer,
104 S. Ct. at 2022-23.
12. 578 F. Supp. 1109 (E.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 742 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1984), reh'g de-
nied, 755 F.2d 31 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3190, 3193 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1985)
(No. 84-1923). Questions regarding subject matter jurisdiction have also been raised in
the petitions for certiorari to the Supreme Court in Hyatt v. Heckler, 54 U.S.L.W. 3229
(U.S. Sept. 19, 1985) (No. 85-474) and Heckler v. Polaski, 54 U.S.L.W. 3028 (U.S. July
11, 1985) (No. 85-55).
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regulations by denying claimants an individualized assessment of
their capacity to work. 13 The court waived both exhaustion and the
sixty-day rule in certifying a plaintiff class of more than 50,000
claimants suffering from severe mental illnesses. The court awarded
interim benefits to plaintiffs whose benefits had been terminated,
the interim benefits to be paid until the Secretary issued procedur-
ally correct decisions. While the Secretary did not appeal the dis-
trict court's ruling on the merits, 14 she contested the district court's
jurisdiction over most members of the class. The Second Circuit
affirmed jurisdiction under § 405(g), waiving the exhaustion and
sixty-day requirements.' 5 The Supreme Court has granted certio-
rari to evaluate the grant of subject matter jurisdiction.' 6
This Comment examines the validity of waiving exhaustion of ad-
ministrative remedies and the sixty-day rule in City of New York, sum-
marizing prior case law with a view toward resolving inconsistencies
and ambiguities. Part I contrasts the establishment of prerequisites
for waiver of exhaustion in Mathews v. Eldridge17 with the denial of
waiver in the recent Supreme Court case, Heckler v. Ringer.' 8 A cri-
tique of Ringer is offered along with the suggestion that courts ad-
here to the analysis set forth in Eldridge. 19 Part II discusses waiver of
13. Regulations require administrators to assess the ability of mentally impaired
claimants to handle the stresses of the workplace, to understand instructions, and to
respond appropriately to supervisors and co-workers. 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1545(c),
416.945(c) (1985). See Rubenstein, SSA Issues New Rules Governing Mental Impairment
Claims, 19 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 715, 722 (1985); Weinstein, supra note 2, at 919.
14. The Secretary abandoned the unpublished policy after suit was filed in the dis-
trict court. The discontinuation of this policy also followed the issuance of a preliminary
injunction in Mental Health Ass'n of Minnesota v. Schweiker, 554 F. Supp. 157 (D.
Minn. 1982), aff'd, 720 F.2d 965 (8th Cir. 1983), which declared the challenged policy
illegal.
15. 742 F.2d at 736-38. The Second Circuit found mandamus jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1361 as an alternate source ofjurisdiction. Id. at 739. The Second Circuit also
affirmed the award of interim benefits. Id. at 740. The Secretary's appeal to the
Supreme Court, does not challenge the remedial decree.
16. The appeal to the Supreme Court also challenges the award of mandamus juris-
diction as an alternative source of jurisdiction. 54 U.S.L.W. 3193 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1985)
(No. 84-1923). Many courts have granted mandamus jurisdiction when the Secretary's
procedures violated a nondiscretionary duty owed to claimants and no other remedy was
available. See, e.g., Ganem v. Heckler, 746 F.2d 844 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Kuehner v.
Schweiker, 717 F.2d 813, 819 (3d Cir. 1983), remanded on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 376
(1984); Dietsch v. Schweiker, 700 F.2d 865 (2d Cir. 1983); Belles v. Schweiker, 720 F.2d
509 (8th Cir. 1983); Ellis v. Blum, 643 F.2d 68 (2d Cir. 1981); Martinez v. Richardson,
472 F.2d 1121 (10th Cir. 1973). Cf Hyatt v. Heckler, 757 F.2d 1455, 1461 (4th Cir.
1985) (mandamus jurisdiction denied because criteria not met).
17. 424 U.S. 310, 96 S. Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976).
18. 104 S. Ct. 2013 (1984).
19. Circuit courts have split in their application of Ringer to SSD cases. The Fourth
Circuit held that Ringer limits the availability of waiver of exhaustion for procedural chal-




the sixty-day limitation in the context of equitable tolling of other
statutory limitations on the filing of claims.20 This Comment argues
that equitable tolling should be applied to the sixty-day rule when
the Secretary's secretive policies violate the Constitution, statutes or
regulations. 2 1
I. Waiver of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
A. The Prerequisites for Waiver. The Eldridge Test
Mathews v. Eldridge22 held that courts may waive the exhaustion
requirement of § 405(g), 23 against the Secretary's wishes,24 "where
Johnson v. Heckler, 776 F.2d 166, 167-68 (7th Cir. 1985) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting
from denial of rehearing en banc.) The Second, Seventh, Eighth and Tenth Circuits
distinguished Ringer, finding that it did not preclude waiver in the cases they reviewed.
Johnson v. Heckler, 769 F.2d 1202, 1208 (7th Cir. 1985); Reed v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 779,
785 (10th Cir. 1985); Polaski v. Heckler, 751 F.2d 943, 951 (8th Cir. 1984); City of New
York, 742 F.2d at 737-38.
20. This Comment does not address the issue of whether the Secretary is exempt
from waiver of the statute of limitations due to the government's sovereign immunity
from suit.
21. Circuit courts have disagreed in their decisions regarding whether the 60-day
rule may be waived, and if so, the circumstances under which waiver is permitted. The
Fourth and Sixth Circuits held that the 60-day requirement is jurisdictional and cannot
be waived. Hunt v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d 121, 122 (4th Cir. 1982); Biron v. Harris, 668
F.2d 259, 261 (6th Cir. 1982); Whipp v. Weinberger, 505 F.2d 800, 801 (6th Cir. 1974).
The Second, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits held that the 60-day
rule may be waived. The Fifth, Seventh, Eighth and Eleventh Circuits have permitted
waiver when the defense of the 60-day rule was not timely raised. Johnson, 769 F.2d at
1209; Mental Health Ass'n of Minnesota v. Heckler, 720 F.2d 965, 973 n.19 (8th Cir.
1983); Hatchell v. Heckler, 708 F.2d 578, 580 n.l (1 th Cir. 1983); Rowland v. Califano,
588 F.2d 449,450 n.2 (5th Cir. 1979). The Ninth Circuit permitted waiver of the 60-day
rule for an "extraordinary [case] involving bad faith on the part of the Secretary." Lo-
pez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489, 1506-07 (9th Cir. 1984), remanded on other grounds, 105 S.
Ct. 584 (1985). The Second Circuit held in City of New York that the secretive conduct of
the Secretary warranted tolling the 60-day rule. 742 F.2d at 739; accord Borzeka v. Heck-
ler, 739 F.2d 444, 448 n.3 (9th Cir. 1984).
22. Eldridge alleged that he was entitled, under the due process clause, U.S. CoNsT.
amend. XIV § 1, to an evidentiary hearing prior to the termination of disability benefits.
Eldridge did not appeal the termination decision he received to the reconsideration
stage. Instead, he filed suit in federal court. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 325.
23. Eldridge held that § 4 05(g) jurisdiction also requires that the recipient of disabil-
ity benefits present a claim when the Secretary conducts a Continuing Disability Investi-
gation to determine whether the claimant's disability has ceased. The Eldridge Court
ruled that the presentment requirement for jurisdiction, i.e. the requirement that the
claimant first present a claim to the Secretary, is not waivable. Eldridge satisfied the
presentment requirement by answering the state agency questionnaire and by writing a
letter prior to the termination of his benefits in response to the tentative determination
that his disability had ceased. 424 U.S. at 328-30. See also, Ringer, 104 S. Ct. at 2023,
2025; Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 703 & n.15 (1979); Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S.
67, 75 (1976); City of New York, 742 F.2d at 735-36.
24. Prior to the ruling in Eldridge, the Supreme Court allowed § 405(g) jurisdiction
in the absence of exhaustion only when the courts construed the Secretary's actions as
waiving this requirement. See Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 765-67 (1975); Wein-
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a claimant's interest in having a particular issue resolved promptly is
so great that deference to the agency's judgment is inappropri-
ate." 25 Eldridge established three criteria for determining whether
the claimant's need for judicial review overrides the agency's inter-
est in completing administrative review. These prerequisites re-
quire courts to assess the separation of powers between the
judiciary and the administrative agency. 26 Eldridge compels waiver
where (1) exhaustion is futile and will not eliminate the need for
judicial intervention, (2) the issue at bar is entirely collateral to the
claim for benefits, and (3) irreparable harm will befall the claimant if
exhaustion is not waived. 27
First, exhaustion is considered futile when pursuit of administra-
tive remedies will not resolve the procedural issues. 28 The futility
prerequisite to waiver requires courts to determine whether the
question at bar is best addressed by the courts or the administrative
agency.2 9 Courts must distinguish between cases in which judicial
review is required to vindicate legal rights and those in which ad-
berger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 641 n.8 (1975); Jiminez v. Weinberger, 523 F.2d
689, 694-95 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 427 U.S. 912 (1976).
25. 424 U.S. at 330.
26. See, supra note 5 and accompanying text.
27. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 330-32. The Eldridge Court stated that it was adopting a
"practical" approach to jurisdiction. 424 U.S. at 331 n.l 1. Cf Reed v. Heckler, 756
F.2d 779, 785 (10th Cir.) (exhaustion would impose "an unfair result"); Polaski v. Heck-
ler, 751 F.2d 943, 951-52 (8th Cir. 1984) ("flexible, pragmatic approach"); City of New
York, 742 F.2d at 736 ("no one factor is critical"). See also, Johnson v. Heckler, 769 F.2d
1202, 1207 (7th Cir. 1985); Mental Health Ass'n of Minnesota v. Schweiker, 720 F.2d
965, 969 (8th Cir. 1983);Jones v. Califano, 576 F.2d 12, 19-20 (2d Cir. 1978); Aldrich v.
Schweiker, 555 F. Supp. 1080, 1088 (D. Vt. 1982).
28. The Secretary is not expected to change her nationwide policies in the context of
the review of the individual applicant's claim for benefits. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 330.
Many courts have held that once the Secretary finalizes her policies and procedures, it is
futile for claimants to challenge her procedures in administrative hearings which are
obliged to uphold these policies. Johnson, 769 F.2d at 1208; Livermore v. Heckler, 743
F.2d 1396, 1405 (9th Cir. 1984); Kuehner v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 813, 818 (3d Cir.
1983), remanded on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 376 (1984);Jones, 576 F.2d at 19; Liberty
Alliance of the Blind v. Califano, 568 F.2d 333, 346 (3d Cir. 1977); Mayburg v. Heckler,
574 F. Supp. 922, 926 (D. Mass 1983); Tatum v. Mathews, 541 F.2d 161, 164 (6th Cir.
1976); Adams v. Califano, 474 F. Supp. 974, 984 (D. Md. 1979), afd sub nom., Adams v.
Harris, 643 F.2d 995 (4th Cir. 1981). Cf Polaski, 751 F.2d at 954 (Gibson,J., dissenting)
(further evidence of improper procedure required to obtain waiver of exhaustion);
Smith v. Schweiker, 709 F.2d 777, 781 (2d Cir. 1983) (further factual development
needed at administrative level).
29. In Weinberger v. Salfi, the Court distinguished between the importance of purpo-
sive exhaustion in preventing "premature interference with agency processes" and the
inappropriateness of futile exhaustion which merely wastes administrative resources.
422 U.S. at 765-66. Many courts have waived exhaustion in order to conserve adminis-
trative and judicial resources. Reed, 756 F.2d at 785; Livermore, 743 F.2d at 1405; Mental
Health Ass'n, 720 F.2d at 970-71; Kuehner, 717 F.2d at 818; Caswell v. Califano, 583 F.2d
9, 14 n.12 (1st Cir. 1978); Liberty Alliance, 568 F.2d at 345; Adams, 474 F. Supp. at 982;




ministrative review is essential to determine facts pertinent to an in-
dividual's claim for benefits.
The second requirement under Eldridge for waiver of exhaustion
demands that the legal questions presented must be collateral to the
claim for benefits. This requirement is also premised on concern
for preserving the distinct roles of the judiciary and the administra-
tive agency.30 A collateral challenge does not call for a determina-
tion of entitlement to benefits,31 but rather questions the criteria
applied by the Secretary in deciding entitlements under the Social
Security Act.3 2 Nevertheless, all procedural issues, including those
raised in Eldridge, affect the likelihood that claimants will receive
benefits.33 Therefore, the "entirely collateral" standard set forth in
Eldridge could not have meant that the constitutional challenge was
superfluous to a claim for benefits. This prerequisite should be
viewed as a measure of degree, not as an absolute calculation.3 4
Finally, because both the health and financial solvency of SSD
claimants depend upon the uninterrupted receipt of benefits, retro-
active payments may not remedy the harm suffered when judicial
review is delayed during the completion of administrative review.3 5
30. The collateral prerequisite signifies that the role of the administrative agency is
to engage in the fact-finding necessary for a determination of entitlement. When entitle-
ment is not at issue, judicial review will not interfere with the powers of the administra-
tive agency.
31. In contrast, many SSD suits, particularly claims by a single plaintiff, raise issues
of the application of the law to the facts of an individual's particular disabling medical
condition. These cases require the court to determine whether the claimant is entitled
to benefits.
32. Given the differences in the disabling medical conditions among members of the
plaintiff class, not all will receive benefits upon resolution of a collateral challenge. See
Johnson, 769 F.2d at 1208; Caswell, 583 F.2d at 14; Mayburg, 574 F. Supp. at 926; Adams,
474 F. Supp. at 981.
33. See Reed, 756 F.2d at 784 n.6.
34. Some courts have allowed waiver where the SSD procedural challenge was "sub-
stantially collateral" to the claim for benefits. Polaski, 751 F.2d at 953; City of New York,
742 F.2d at 737; Kuehner, 717 F.2d at 823 (Becker,J., concurring); Mayburg, 574 F. Supp.
at 926; Adams, 474 F. Supp. at 981. Accord Johnson, 769 F.2d at 1208; Schisler v.
Schweiker, No. 80-572E, slip. op. at 5, 6 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 14, 1981), appeal docketed, No.
85-6092/6096 (2d Cir. Mar. 20, 1985). ContraJohnson, 776 F.2d at 167-68 (Easterbrook,
J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
35. The district court in Polaski v. Heckler stated, "Claimants who lose or are denied
benefits face foreclosure proceedings on their homes, suffer utility cutoffs and find it
difficult to purchase food. They go without medication and doctors' care; they lose their
medical insurance. They become increasingly anxious, depressed, despairing - all of
which aggravates their medical conditions." 585 F. Supp. 1004, 1013 (D. Minn. 1984).
Accord Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 331; Reed, 756 F.2d at 783; Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489,
1497 (9th Cir. 1984), remanded on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 584 (1985); Mental Health Ass'n,
720 F.2d at 970; Bartlett v. Schweiker, 719 F.2d 1059, 1061 (10th Cir. 1983); Caswell,
583 F.2d at 14;Jones, 576 F.2d at 20; Schisler v. Schweiker, No. 80-572E, slip op. at 6
(W.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1981), appeal docketed, No. 85-6092/6096 (2d Cir. Mar. 20, 1985);
Holden v. Heckler, 584 F. Supp. 463, 483 (N.D. Ohio 1984); City of New York, 578 F.
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The claimant's interest in preventing irreparable harm may warrant
waiver of exhaustion.
B. The Denial of Waiver of Exhaustion in Ringer
Heckler v. Ringer concerned the availability ofjurisdiction for Medi-
care claims 3 6 under § 405(g), 37 the same section of the Social Secur-
ity Act which grants judicial review for SSD claims.38 None of the
named plaintiffs in Ringer had exhausted their administrative reme-
dies at the time of filing suit;3 9 instead, they requested waiver of
exhaustion under the Eldridge analysis.
In Ringer, claimants challenged the policy of the Secretary, which
was codified in two administrative instructions, prohibiting Medi-
care reimbursement for the surgical procedure of bilateral carotid
body resection (BCBR). 4° Three of the named plaintiffs underwent
BCBR prior to the effective date of the second administrative rul-
ing.41 The fourth, Ringer, never obtained the surgery, because he
learned informally from the administrative agency that Medicare re-
imbursement would not be provided. He could not afford to pay for
the procedure himself.42
The complaint in Ringer alleged that the Secretary's instructions
exceeded the limits of her discretion, violating the Medicare Act, the
Administrative Procedure Act, and the Due Process Clause of the
Fifth Amendment.43 The plaintiffs claimed the right to present to
Supp. at 1118; Mayburg, 574 F. Supp. at 926; Fitzgerald v. Schweiker, 538 F. Supp. 992,
998 (D. Md. 1982). See also, Yohalem, supra note 2, at 998-99; N.Y. Times, May 19, 1982,
at BI, col. 5; Note, supra note 2, at 196-98.
36. Medicare is a federally subsidized health insurance program established by Title
XVIII of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (1982) [hereinafter cited as the Medi-
care Act].
37. Ringer, 104 S. Ct. at 2017.
38. See supra, notes 6, 8, 9 and accompanying text.
39. The first two stages of the four-level administrative review process are different
for Medicare than for SSD. The application for Medicare payments is made to fiscal
intermediaries, such as Blue Cross, and reconsideration is provided by the Health Care
Financing Administration (HCFA). For SSD, the application and reconsideration proce-
dures are handled in state Disability Determination Services. The final two stages of
appeal, i.e. to the ALJs and Appeals Council, are procedurally identical for Medicare and
SSD. See Ringer, 104 S. Ct. at 2017.
40. The first ruling was binding on the fiscal intermediaries and HCFA; the second
applied to the ALJs and Appeals Council. 104 S. Ct. at 2017-18.
41. These claimants were not barred from receiving reimbursement from the ALJs
or Appeals Council. Id. at 2021 & n.9.
42. Ringer 104 S. Ct. at 2019. Prior to the effective date of the Secretary's ruling,
most surgeons did not require prepayment, instead relying on subsequent administra-
tive review and the Secretary's policy of reimbursement. But once administrative hear-
ings became preempted by the BCBR rule, surgeons could no longer depend upon
after-the-fact reimbursements. Id. at 2036 n.33 (Stevens, J., dissenting).




administrators, on a case-by-case basis, the medical justification for
a surgery whose value was disputed by the medical profession. The
Secretary's instructions categorically prohibited reimbursement.
44
According to the plaintiffs, this policy interfered with the rights con-
ferred on claimants by the Constitution and statutes.4
5
The district court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that it
did not have jurisdiction over the claims in the absence of exhaus-
tion. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, holding
that exhaustion would be futile46 and would impose irreparable
harm. 47
The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals, denying sub-
ject matter jurisdiction 48 because the criteria for waiver of exhaus-
tion under § 405(g) had not been met. Since claimant Ringer did
not undergo the surgery and request reimbursement, the majority
did not reach the question of whether he had satisfied the prerequi-
sites for waiver.49 The Court held that the three claimants who had
undergone BCBR50 had not met any of the three Eldridge criteria for
waiver of exhaustion. 5'
44. The Secretary relied on information from the Public Health Service and a special
Task Force of the National Heart, Lung and Blood Institute of the National Institute of
Health in reaching the conclusion that BCBR had not been proven effective, and there-
fore was "not 'reasonable and necessary' within the meaning of the Medicare Act." See
Ringer, 104 S. Ct. at 2018; 42 U.S.C.§§ 1395y(a)(l) (1982).
45. Ringer, 104 S. Ct. at 2019.
46. The court of appeals found that the Secretary's instructions to ALJs and the Ap-
peals Council made the results of that process "both pre-ordained and immutable."
Ringer v. Schweiker, 697 F.2d 1291, 1295 (9th Cir. 1982).
47. The court of appeals combined the collateral and irreparable harm prerequisites
from Eldridge. Procedural issues were distinguished from claims for benefits, because
payment at the ALJ or Appeals Council level would not compensate irreparable harm.
This harm stemmed from being forced to pursue appeals in order to obtain reimburse-
ment. Ringer, 697 F.2d at 1296.
48. The Court also held that federal question jurisdiction was unavailable and that
mandamus jurisdiction could not apply in this case. 104 S. Ct. at 2022-23. See supra,
note 16.
49. The Court held that because Ringer did not present a claim to the Secretary as
required by the "final decision" language of § 405(g), he failed to satisfy the nonwaiv-
able presentment prerequisite. 104 S. Ct. at 2025. See supra, note 23. Justice Stevens,
joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissented with regard to the Court's handling
of Ringer's claim. 104 S. Ct. at 2028. First, the dissent would have granted federal
question jurisdiction. Id. at 2030-32. Second, the dissent believed that Ringer satisfied
both the nonwaivable and waivable prerequisites of § 405(g) jurisdiction, and that sub-
ject matter jurisdiction was therefore available. Id. at 2034-35. The dissent concluded
that the decision of the Secretary was final and satisfied presentment as well as the futil-
ity requirement. The dissent believed that Ringer was irreparably injured by his inability
to obtain treatment for his illness and that this injury was collateral. Id. at 2034-36.
50. These claimants were found to have satisfied the nonwaivable presentment re-
quirement. Id. at 2023.
51. Id. at 2023. Justice Stevens concurred with the Court's judgment as to these
claimants. Id. at 2028-29.
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While acknowledging that the complaint raised procedural issues,
the majority nevertheless ruled that the challenge was not "wholly
'collateral' " to a claim for benefits. 52 The Court explained its deci-
sion by noting that the relief claimants requested "to redress their
supposed 'procedural' objections is . . . a 'substantive' declaration
from [the Secretary] that the expenses of BCBR surgery are
reimbursible under the Medicare Act."5 3 The Court believed that
upon issuance of the requested declaration, "only essentially minis-
terial details will remain before [the claimants] would receive
reimbursement. "54
The Court's determination that the challenge was not sufficiently
collateral directed the holding with regard to the other two prereq-
uisites. Since the majority viewed the procedural issues as inter-
twined with a claim for benefits, it held that payment through
administrative channels would satisfy the claimants' procedural
challenge.55 The majority concluded that exhaustion was not futile
and would not impose irreparable harm, because administrative ap-
peal could yield financial remuneration. 56
C. The Validity of Waiver of Exhaustion for Procedural Challenges
While the Ringer Court purported to apply the Eldridge test for
waiver of exhaustion, a closer analysis reveals that Ringer and El-
dridge differ fundamentally in their view of a collateral challenge and
in their application of the separation of powers doctrine. City of New
York highlights many of the reasons why the Eldridge approach is
needed and provides an opportunity for the Court to resolve dis-
crepancies between Ringer and Eldridge.
The Ringer majority justified its holding that the procedural issues
were not collateral by characterizing the requested remedy as the
functional equivalent of a determination of entitlement. 57 The
52. Id. at 2023.
53. Id. at 2021. "[T]he claims of those three respondents [are] . . . at bottom, a
claim that they should be paid for their BCBR surgery. Arguably respondents do assert
objections to the Secretary's 'procedure' for reaching her decision. . . . [H]owever,
.. . those claims are 'inextricably intertwined' with respondents' claims for benefits."
Id. The majority also characterized plaintiff Ringer's complaint as "essentially" a re-
quest for payment. Id. at 2024.
54. Id. at 2022.
55. The majority noted the high probability of receiving benefits at the ALJ stage for
claimants who obtained BCBR prior to the effective date of the Secretary's administra-
tive instruction to the ALJs. Id. at 2024. See infra note 60 and accompanying text.
56. 104 S. Ct. at 2024.
57. See supra notes 51 to 53 and accompanying text. If this characterization were




Court noted that prior to the Secretary's ruling, when BCBR was
reimbursible, ALJs and the Appeals Council had consistently
granted benefits. But, as the majority itself pointed out, the pay-
ment of benefits was due to the medical needs of the particular
claimants involved. 58 A declaration that BCBR surgery is "reimbur-
sible" would not guarantee payment of Medicare benefits to all
BCBR recipients, 59 but rather would permit the administrative
agency to deny benefits on a case-by-case basis to any claimants
whose medical conditions did not warrant the surgery. 60 The
Court's characterization of administrative review as merely a "minis-
terial detail" conflicts with its own emphasis on the importance of
exhaustion of administrative remedies.
The Court noted that, according to the plaintiffs' statistical ac-
counting, reimbursement at the ALJ stage was very likely for the
three named plaintiffs who had obtained BCBR. This probability
was based on the claimants' receipt of BCBR prior to the effective
date of the Secretary's administrative instruction to the ALJs. Such
data is crucial for determining whether the claimants had standing
to challenge this instruction,6' but irrelevant for deciding whether
the claim was collateral. The distinctiveness of procedural and sub-
stantive issues does not hinge upon the probability of obtaining
benefits for reasons unrelated to the procedural challenge.
The Ringer majority indicated that the courts should not address
pretermination hearing, did not ensure that the claimant would be deemed entitled to
benefits.
58. 104 S. Ct. at 2018. In granting benefits to one group of claimants, the Appeals
Council explicitly stated that its decision applied only to these claimants and was not to
be cited as precedent. Id.
59. The plaintiffs had requested class certification, but the district court dismissed
the complaint before ruling on class certification. Id. at 2019 n.5. The class would have
included claimants who did not even reach the second stage of the administrative ap-
peals process, i.e. reconsideration.
60. The administrative agency determines whether the reimbursible item is medi-
cally necessary for each claimant, and if'so, the rate of reimbursement. See 2 MEDICARE
& MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 10,193, 10,217 (Mar. 1985) regarding surgical procedures
and bill review and 1 MEDICARE & MEDICAID GUIDE (CCH) 3190.76 (Oct. 1985) re-
garding reasonable charge. Payment is not automatic. Many Medicare claims for
reimbursible items are routinely denied. See Wilson, Benefit Cutbacks in the Medicare Pro-
gram Through Administrative Agency Fiat Without Procedural Protections: Litigation Approaches on
Behalf of Beneficiaries, 16 GoNz. L. REV. 533, 535-36 (1981).
61. The Court held that these claimants had standing to challenge the ruling di-
rected to the ALJs and Appeals Council, because the complaint had argued "that the
existence of the formal rule creates a presumption against payment of their claims in the
administrative process, even though the rule does not directly apply to bar their claims."
104 S. Ct. at 2021. Cf Adams v. Califano, 474 F. Supp. 974, 983 (D. Md. 1979), affd sub
nom., Adams v. Harris, 643 F.2d 995 (4th Cir. 1981) (plaintiffs have standing because of
likelihood of adverse decision at ALJ hearing). The Ringer majority then proceeded to
rebut this presumption by disallowing waiver. 104 S. Ct. at 2024.
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procedural issues when benefits can be obtained on other grounds
at a later stage in the administrative process. 62 Until claimants ex-
haust administrative remedies, they do not know whether they are
entitled to receive benefits regardless of the procedural illegality.
The reasoning of the Ringer majority suggests that claimants must
exhaust administrative remedies in order to challenge the initial
levels of review. This suggestion is incompatible with Eldridge.63
The Court failed to recognize this incongruity and provided no jus-
tification, such as fairness or efficiency, for allowing allegedly illegal
determinations at the earlier stages of review to remain uncorrected
when claimants do not exhaust administrative remedies. 64
The majority position embodies a view of the role of the courts
which differs from the separation of powers perspective articulated
in Eldridge.65 In contrast, the Ringer dissent followed the Eldridge
reasoning more closely, concluding that the proper role of the judi-
ciary is to protect the interests of claimants by ensuring the legality
of the Secretary's procedures even when claimants do not exhaust
administrative remedies. 66 Both Eldridge and the Ringer dissent sug-
gested that the proper function of the judiciary is to check the pow-
62. Id. at 2024 n.12. See also, Johnson v. Heckler, 776 F.2d 166, 168 (7th Cir. 1985)
(Easterbrook, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc).
63. In Eldridge, the Court granted § 405(g) jurisdiction for the review of the allega-
tion that the initial termination decision was illegal, even though the claimant never
pursued the second stage of administrative review, i.e. reconsideration, 424 U.S. at 325,
332.
64. Given the Court's prior decisions emphasizing the broad discretionary powers of
the Secretary, it is likely that the Ringer plaintiffs would not have prevailed on the merits
had they been reached. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43 (1980);
Note, Administrative Law -Jurisdiction, Class Action, Injunctive Relief and Nonacquiescence -
Lopez v. Heckler, 7 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 277, 305-06 (1984). Most damaging to the
plaintiffs' chances of prevailing was the holding in Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458
(1982), a case challenging the Secretary's promulgation of medical-vocational guide-
lines, that the discretion of the agency included the power to "rely on its rulemaking
authority to determine issues that do not require case-by-case consideration." 461 U.S.
at 467 (citations omitted). Nevertheless, the likelihood of defeat on the merits does not
diminish the urgency of the claimant's need for review of procedural issues. Indeed,
Eldridge lost his case on the merits. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 349.
65. See supra notes 5, 25, 26 and accompanying text.
66. Claimant Ringer's inability to pay for the surgery prevented him from presenting
a claim for reimbursement to the Secretary. His failure to exhaust administrative reme-
dies then resulted in the majority's ruling denying him access to the courts. The dissent
noted that the majority provided Ringer with "the 'right' to judicial review only if he can
pay for it-and he cannot." The dissent characterized this holding as "ruthless" and
contrary to congressional intent in enacting the Medicare program. Id. at 2038. See also,
Mental Health Ass'n of Minnesota v. Schweiker, 720 F.2d 965, 971 (8th Cir. 1983). The
dissent's emphasis on providing claimant Ringer with an avenue ofjudicial review com-
ports with the legislative history of the enactment of § 405(g). The Senate Committee
on Finance explicitly stated that the purpose of this provision was to ensure that the
Secretary's "decisions on questions of law will be reviewable." S. REP. No. 734, 76th




ers of the administrative agency, to delineate the limits of the
Secretary's discretion, and to enforce the Constitution and statutes.
City of New York demonstrates the importance of reaffirming the
principles embodied in Eldridge.67 In City of New York, as in many
SSD class actions, at least one of the named plaintiffs had exhausted
administrative remedies. 68 This secures jurisdiction under § 405(g),
requiring the court to review allegations of procedural violations af-
fecting large numbers of claimants (the class in City of New York in-
cluded 50,000 mentally ill claimants). In City of New York, the
Eldridge waiver analysis determines not whether the merits will be
heard69 but ratherfor whom they will be addressed. The Court's rul-
ing on waiver will define the scope of the class membership.70
Waiver of exhaustion of administrative remedies in City of New
York serves many of the goals pursued by the separation of powers
approach in Eldridge and does not conflict with Ringer.71 In City of
New York, the exhaustion of administrative remedies by some of the
named plaintiffs informs the court of the Secretary's methods of de-
termining disability for the class.72 Since the Secretary's standards
do not vary according to the facts of individual cases, the exhaustion
67. This analysis is equally valid for procedural challenges which do not involve
claims of clandestine violations of the Secretary's published regulations.
68. Heckler v. City of New York, 742 F.2d 729, 734 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 54
U.S.L.W. 3190 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1985) (No. 84-1923). See, e.g., Johnson v. Heckler, 769 F.2d
1202, 1208 (7th Cir. 1985); Polaski v. Heckler, 751 F.2d 943, 944 (8th. Cir. 1984); Lib-
erty Alliance of the Blind v. Califano, 568 F.2d 333, 344 (3d Cir. 1977);Jiminez v. Wein-
berger, 523 F.2d 689, 692 (7th Cir. 1975); Dixon v. Heckler, 589 F. Supp. 1494, 1500
(S.D.N.Y. 1984), appeal docketed, No. 84-6288 (2d Cir. Sept. 25, 1984); Holden v. Heckler,
584 F. Supp. 463, 475-77 (N.D. Ohio 1984); Mayburg v. Heckler, 574 F. Supp. 922, 925
(D. Mass. 1983); Schisler v. Schweiker, No. 80-572E, slip op. at 8 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 11,
1981); Kennedy v. Harris, 87 F.R.D. 372, 376 (S.D. Cal. 1980).
69. In both Eldridge and Ringer, waiver was a precondition for reaching the merits. A
few courts have permitted waiver when none of the named plaintiffs exhausted adminis-
trative remedies, Kuehner v. Schweiker, 717 F.2d 813, 818 (3d Cir. 1983), remanded on
other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 376 (1984), and when administrative appeals resulted in the
granting of benefits to all named plaintiffs, Reed v. Heckler, 756 F.2d 779, 785 (10th
Cir. 1985);Jones v. Califano, 576 F.2d 12, 20-21 (2d Cir. 1978); Fitzgerald v. Schweiker,
538 F. Supp. 992, 995 (D. Md. 1982). Cf Adams, 474 F. Supp. at 979-80, 982-83 (addi-
tional claimants allowed to intervene to prevent mootness). See Goldstein, The Procedural
Impact of Weinberger v. Salfi Revisited, 31 DE PAUL L. REV. 738 & n.94 (1982). But see,
Smith v. Schweiker, 709 F.2d 777, 779 (2d Cir. 1983) (no jurisdiction because named
plaintiffs had neither lost benefits nor exhausted administrative remedies.)
70. Califano v. Yamasaki held that class relief under FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2) is permit-
ted for claimants who meet the requirement of § 405(g). 442 U.S. 682, 700-01 (1979).
Yamasaki did not address the appropriateness of waiver of exhaustion in class actions.
71. Since Ringer neither overruled nor suggested any reason for abandoning the El-
dridge prerequisites for jurisdiction under § 405(g), but rather misapplied the Eldridge
analysis, waiver for procedural challenges is consistent with Ringer.
72. When one or more claimants exhaust their administrative remedies, their claims
exemplify the administrative response at each level of review. In City of New York, the
court found that the presumption against disability recorded in forms filled out at the
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of administrative remedies by 50,000 class members would not en-
hance the court's ability to evaluate the legality of the Secretary's
procedures. Administrative exhaustion is futile for resolving the
procedural challenge. Review of procedural questions is within the
scope of judicial, not administrative, powers.
Second, resolution of the procedural issues in favor of the plain-
tiffs in City of New York would not automatically entitle claimants to
backpayments. Instead, the Secretary would be required to issue
new disability decisions, which would be reached after applying the
correct procedures. Since judicial review does not determine
awards of benefits, the procedural issue is collateral and may be ad-
dressed by the courts without interfering with the powers of the ad-
ministrative agency. 78
Third, waiver of exhaustion in City of New York decreases the risk
that disabled individuals will be deprived of the benefits to which
they are entitled, thereby minimizing the possibility of inflicting ir-
reparable harm.74 If waiver is not permitted, interim benefits will be
cut off for many claimants,75 with the likely result of inflicting finan-
cial troubles and aggravating medical disorders. 76 Administrative
processes will not protect these claimants; the responsibility for
preventing irreparable harm falls upon the courts.
Claimants need judicial intervention to ensure that their claims
are decided in conformity with the procedural protections guaran-
initial administrative stage affected the supposedly de novo determinations at the ALJ
stage. 742 F.2d at 733. See Rubenstein, supra note 13, at 715.
73. The impact of procedural questions on a claim for benefits in SSD cases is more
subtle than in Ringer; the desired remedy does not include a declaration that payment is
permissible. As a result, courts may be more convinced of the collateral nature of the
claim. A number of courts have distinguished Ringer, in which procedural and substan-
tive issues were found to be intertwined, from those SSD cases which challenge the Sec-
retary's standards for determining disability,Johnson, 769 F.2d at 1208; Polaski, 751 F.2d
at 952-53; City of New York, 742 F.2d at 736-37; contra Hyatt, 757 F.2d at 1460, and the
Secretary's notice procedures, Reed, 756 F.2d at 784. Courts have applied Ringer more
stringently in Medicare cases. See, e.g., Hatcher v. Heckler, 772 F.2d 427, 430-31 (8th
Cir. 1985); Miller v. Heckler, 601 F. Supp. 1471, 1483 (E.D. Tex. 1985).
74. The importance of lessening the risk of improper denials contributed to the
court's decision to waive exhaustion in Reed, 756 F.2d at 785; Polaski, 751 F.2d at 952;
Mental Health Ass'n, 720 F.2d at 971; and Liberty Alliance, 568 F.2d at 346.
The Ringer majority suggested that waiver should be denied in order to give the ad-
ministrative agency an opportunity to find a reason for granting benefits which is exoge-
nous to the procedural issue at bar. This approach increases the likelihood that
irreparable harm will be inflicted. Ringer provides no remedy for claimants who fail to
exhaust administrative remedies and delays judicial review for claimants who appeal the
Secretary's unfavorable decisions.
75. If the court does not have jurisdiction over claimants who have not exhausted
administrative remedies, it does not have the power to award them benefits.




teed in the Constitution, statutes and regulations. In City of New
York, their interest in judicial relief far outweighs the Secretary's in-
terest in completing administrative review. Waiver of exhaustion
should be permitted in City of New York and in other procedural chal-
lenges which pursue the separation of powers objectives of
Eldridge.77
II. Waiver of the Sixty-Day Limitation
A. The Availability of Waiver of the Sixty-Day Rule
Eldridge established both the permissibility of waiver of exhaustion
of administrative remedies and the circumstances in which waiver is
authorized. However, there is no equivalent precedent regarding
waiver78 of the sixty-day limitation.79 The Supreme Court has
stated in dicta that the sixty-day rule is a "statute of limitations"
which is "waivable by the parties"80 but has never ruled directly on
77. While Eldridge involved a purely constitutional challenge, the claimants' interest
in obtaining judicial review of alleged violations of statutes may suffice to warrant
waiver. Many courts have held that exhaustion may be waived for statutory procedural
challenges. Reed, 756 F.2d at 785; Lopez v. Heckler, 725 F.2d 1489, 1503 (9th Cir.
1984), remanded on other grounds, 105 S. Ct. 584 (1985); Mental Health Ass'n, 720 F.2d at
971; Kuehner, 717 F.2d at 817-18; Wright v. Califano, 587 F.2d 345, 349 (7th Cir. 1978);
Caswell, 583 F.2d at 14;Jones, 576 F.2d at 18; Liberty Alliance, 568 F.2d at 346; Mayburg,
574 F. Supp. at 925; Fitzgerald, 538 F. Supp. at 997-98. See Goldstein, supra note 68, at
743.
78. Referring to the sixty-day rule, courts use the terms "waivable" and "not juris-
dictional" interchangeably. Both phrases indicate that the requirement of appeal within
sixty days may be set aside by the courts, without abrogating the judicial right and power
to adjudicate the subject matter of the case. However, the holding that a time bar is
ordinarily jurisdictional does not preclude a finding that waiver is permitted under lim-
ited circumstances. See City of New York, 742 F.2d at 738 n.6. Compare Hofer v. Campbell,
581 F.2d 975 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (time bar jurisdictional) with Coles v. Penny, 531 F.2d 609
(D.C. Cir. 1976) (time bar waived).
Courts may also describe the waiver of the sixty-day limitation as "tolling" the rule.
When the sixty-day rule is "tolled", it is not permanently barred but rather is temporar-
ily suspended. See, e.g. Smith v. American President Lines, 571 F.2d 102, 109 (2d Cir.
1978).
79. The Eldridge prerequisites to waiver of exhaustion of administrative remedies do
not provide a basis for waiving the sixty-day rule. Eldridge attempted to balance the
utility of administrative remedies against the need for judicial review. Claimants who
miss the deadline for filing administrative appeals are time barred from obtaining ad-
ministrative review and therefore have no avenue of relief other than the courts.
80. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 328 n.9; Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 763-64 (1975).
In Salfi and Eldridge, the defense of the statute of limitations was not "timely raised be-
low" and therefore did not "need [to] be considered." Id. A number of circuit courts
have held that waiver is permitted when the Secretary fails to raise the defense of the 60-
day rule in a timely manner. Johnson, 769 F.2d at 1209; Mental Health Ass 'n, 720 F.2d at
973 n.19; Hatchell v. Heckler, 708 F.2d 578, 580 n.l (11th Cir. 1983); Rowland v.
Califano, 588 F.2d 449, 450 n.2 (5th Cir. 1979); Wilson v. Edelman, 542 F.2d 1260,
1274 (7th Cir. 1976).
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the question.8 ' Circuit courts have disagreed as to the weight that
should be accorded to the dicta, and some have held that the sixty-
day rule is jurisdictional and therefore not subject to waiver.8 2 City
of New York provides an opportunity for the Court to resolve the
conflicting interpretations of prior case law regarding whether the
sixty-day limitation may be waived.
In City of New York, the Second Circuit espoused the view that the
sixty-day limitation is not jurisdictional and held that the sixty-day
period was "effectively tolled" during the time the Secretary's policy
denying claimants an individualized assessment of their capacity to
work was "operative but undisclosed". 83 The court of appeals be-
lieved that the Secretary's secretive conduct prevented claimants
from knowing that their rights had been violated. Finding that "the
full extent of the Government's clandestine policy" was uncovered
in the course of the litigation, the court tolled the sixty-day require-
ment until the lawsuit was underway.8 4
The Second Circuit drew support for its holding from Barrett v.
United States,85 a case involving a claim under the Federal Tort
Claims Act. In Barrett, the statute of limitations was tolled because
the government suppressed information regarding a tort injury.
The City of New York court also cited Lopez v. Heckler,86 an SSD case in
which the Ninth Circuit tolled the sixty-day rule. The Ninth Circuit
stated in Lopez that the sixty-day rule is similar to the time limitation
81. Justice Stevens has discussed the sixty-day rule in a number of his dissents and
concurrences. In his partial dissent in Lopez, 464 U.S. 879, 881 (1983), Justice Stevens
stated that the court "had no jurisdiction to review the Secretary's refusal to reopen"
cases whose time for appeal "had expired". However, in his partial dissent in Ringer, he
quoted with favor Salfi's characterization of the sixty-day rule as a waivable statute of
limitations. 104 S. Ct. at 2023 n.25. See also, Norton v. Mathews, 427 U.S. 524, 536 n.4
(1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
82. Biron v. Harris, 668 F.2d 259, 261 (6th Cir. 1982); Hunt v. Schweiker, 685 F.2d
121, 122 (4th Cir. 1982); accord Johnson, 776 F.2d at 168 (Easterbrook,J., dissenting from
denial of rehearing en banc). However, the Fourth and Sixth Circuits have held that
when the claimant's mental illness prevents her from understanding and pursuing her
administrative remedies, the 60-day rule would deny her due process and therefore does
not apply. Parker v. Califano, 644 F.2d 1199, 1203 (6th Cir. 1981) (citing Califano v.
Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 109 (1977)); Shrader v. Harris, 631 F.2d 297, 302-03 (4th Cir.
1980) (citing Sanders, 430 U.S. at 109).
83. The Second Circuit did not address the district court's finding that the Secretary
had not asserted the defense of the 60-day limitation in a timely manner. The issue was
first mentioned in the Secretary's post-trial brief. City of New York, 578 F. Supp. at 1124.
The Second Circuit stated that even if this defense had been timely, it would not have
prevailed. 742 F.2d at 738.
84. 742 F.2d at 738.
85. 689 F.2d 324, 327-30 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub nom., Cattell v. Barrett, 461
U.S. 909 (1983).





for initiating employment discrimination claims, 87 since both are
statutes of limitations subject to waiver and equitable tolling.8 8
While the Supreme Court has not yet indicated whether such
analogies are appropriate, its decisions in federal tort and employ-
ment discrimination cases bear some striking similarities to its opin-
ions regarding SSD. In all three contexts the Court has stated that
the purpose of time restrictions on the filing of law suits is to en-
courage the prompt presentation of claims and to preclude stale
claims.89 The concern with staleness is "not so compelling" for SSD
procedural challenges; these cases focus not upon individual fact
questions but rather upon the standard by which the Secretary eval-
uates whatever information is available. 90
In both tort and employment discrimination cases, the Court has
held that the time bar is a statute of limitations which is not jurisdic-
tional.91 This position corresponds to the statement in SSD cases
that the sixty-day rule is a statute of limitations which may be
waived.92 The close resemblance of the Court's discussion of the
sixty-day rule in § 4 05 (g) to its holding that time limitations in tort
and employment discrimination legislation may be waived leads to
the conclusion that the sixty-day rule may also be waived.
B. The Proper Circumstances for Tolling Statutes of Limitations
The justifications for equitable tolling of statutes of limitations in
tort and employment discrimination cases focus on the plaintiff's
lack of knowledge that she has been injured by the defendant, the
87. These actions arise under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e [hereinafter cited as Title VII].
88. Lopez, 725 F.2d at 1505 (citing Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385
(1982) and other cases). Accord Borzeka v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 444, 448 n.3 (9th Cir.
1984).
89. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, 455 U.S. 385, 394 (1982) (Title VII); Kubrick v.
United States, 444 U.S. 111, 117 (1979) (Federal Tort Claims Act); Sanders, 430 U.S. at
108 (Social Security Act).
90. Kennedy v. Harris, 87 F.R.D. 372, 377 (S.D. Cal. 1980). Cf Lopez, 725 F.2d at
1505 (60-day rule designed to promote administrative efficiency not always preclusive of
stale claims litigation). In medical improvement cases, Congress has permitted the rede-
termination of claims irrespective of their age. Reform Act § 2(d). See supra note 7. See
also H.R. REP. No. 1039, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 28 (1984). Some of the claims to be
determined anew are as many as ten years old. See Avery v. Secretary of Health and
Human Services, 762 F.2d 158 (1st Cir. 1985); Kuehner, No. 85-1227, slip op. (3d Cir.
Dec. 9, 1985); Schisler, 107 F.R.D. 609.
91. Zipes, 455 U.S. at 393 (Title VII); Urie v. Thompson, 337 U.S. 163, 169-70
(1949) (tort claim under Federal Employers' Liability Act). Circuit courts have differed
in their application of Zipes to cases involving charges filed against the federal govern-
ment. See Stuckett v. United States Postal Services, 105 S. Ct. 274 (1984) (White, J.,
dissenting from denial of cert.).
92. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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lack of knowledge of the medical or legal community, and the inade-
quacy of the defendant's provision of notice to the plaintiff. In addi-
tion, time bars have been tolled when the defendant's deceptive
conduct induced the plaintiff to delay filing suit. This latter ration-
ale supports waiver of the sixty-day rule in City of New York. 93
In tort litigation, if the plaintiff does not know that she has been
injured, due only to "blameless ignorance,"94 then the statute of
limitations is tolled until the injury is apparent, e.g. when the disease
manifests itself.95 When "facts about causation [are] in the control
of the putative defendant, unavailable to the plaintiff or at least very
difficult to obtain," equitable tolling is warranted. 96 However, igno-
rance of legal rights, resulting from the plaintiff's failure to seek ad-
vice from the medical and legal community, does not suffice to toll
the limitations period.97
The statute of limitations may be tolled until medical science un-
covers the causal relationship between a disease and an injury, for
example the debilitating effects of exposure to chemical sub-
stances.9 8 Prior to the medical discovery, the plaintiff can not know
that a tort has been committed, and therefore is not at fault for fail-
ing to file suit within the prescribed period. Similarly, the time pe-
riod for filing employment discrimination charges does not
93. An alternative approach to waiver of the 60-day limitation is to apply a separa-
tion of powers analysis, similar to the Eldridge reasoning for waiver of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. See supra notes 5, 25, 26 and accompanying text. Insofar as the
Secretary's secretive procedures violate the Constitution, statutes and regulations, she
has abused her delegated powers. Under this analysis, courts should therefore waive the
60-day rule in order to protect claimants who have suffered from the Secretary's abuse
of discretion.
94. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 120 n.7 (quoting Urie, 337 U.S. at 169-70).
95. Id. See Smith v. American President Lines, 571 F.2d 102, 109 n.12 (2d Cir. 1978)
(common law tolling principles). In most tort cases where the injury is obvious, the
statute of limitations begins to run as soon as the tortious act is committed. See, e.g.,
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 899 comments c & e (1977).
96. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 122. See Liuzzo v. United States, 485 F. Supp. 1274, 1281
(E.D. Mich. 1980) (Kubrick "teaches that the facts in each case must be thoroughly ex-
amined to determine when the plaintiff had knowledge of the 'critical facts' regarding his
injury"). See also, DuBose v. Kansas City Southern Ry., 729 F.2d 1026, 1030-31 (5th Cir.
1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 179 (1984).
97. Kubrick, 444 U.S. at 122-25 (plaintiff knew the facts concerning his injury and was
not reasonably diligent in seeking medical and legal advice during the period of limita-
tions). See Ciccarelli v. Carey Canadian Mines, 757 F.2d 548, 556 (3d Cir. 1985) (apply-
ing Pennsylvania law).
98. Stoleson v. United States, 629 F.2d 1265, 1271 (7th Cir. 1980); DuBose, 729 F.2d
at 1031. Cf Barrett v. United States, 689 F.2d 324, 330 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub
nom., Cattell v. Barrett, 461 U.S. 909 (1983) ("It is illogical to require a party to sue the
Government for negligence at a time when the Goverment's responsibility in the matter
is suppressed in a manner designed to prevent the party, even with reasonable effort,
from finding out about it.").
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commence until the facts that would support a charge, such as se-
cret, illegal preferences in hiring, become apparent. 99
This reasoning is applicable to SSD cases, such as City of New York,
in which claimants allege that the Secretary violated her own regula-
tions.100 The "injury" in procedural challenges is the absence of a
fair, lawful administrative process for determining disability, e.g. in
City of New York, claimants did not receive an individualized assess-
ment of their ability to work. The "cause" of the injury is the Secre-
tary's failure to adhere to the Constitution, statutes or regulations.
When the Secretary does not publish the procedures she is actually
employing and transgresses those regulations she has published,
claimants are "blamelessly ignorant" of the illegality of the Secre-
tary's procedures. Due diligence on the part of claimants, e.g. con-
sulting a lawyer, does not expose the injury, because legal counsel
would presumably be equally unaware of the Secretary's deviation
from the regulations.
Ignorance of a procedural illegality is substantively different from
ignorance of the legal right to sue. Claimants may learn of their
legal right to sue by seeking legal advice. However, since counsel
do not know of the procedural irregularity, they may incorrectly ad-
vise claimants regarding the merits of filing appeals. The Second
Circuit correctly stated that claimants "were entitled to believe" that
the Secretary obeyed the law.' 0 '
Identification of the procedural violation may not occur until after
sixty days from the issuance of denial or termination decisions
which are based upon the violation. Counsel may not even suspect
that a procedural violation has occurred unless an unusually large
number of claimants with similar circumstances seek legal assist-
ance, and the accumulation of this critical mass of complainants may
require a significant amount of time. Counsel may not recognize the
99. Reeb v. Economic Opportunity Atlanta, 516 F.2d 924, 931 (5th Cir. 1975). See
Dartt v. Shell Oil, 539 F.2d 1256, 1262 (10th Cir. 1976), afd by an equally divided court,
434 U.S. 99 (1977). See also, International Union of Elec. Workers v. Robbins & Myers,
429 U.S. 229, 237 n.10, 238 (1976).
100. The 60-day rule has been waived, following the rationale in City of New York, in
State of New York v. Heckler, 105 F.R.D. 118 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (challenging the Secre-
tary's unpublished rules regarding cardiovascular impairments); Dixon v. Heckler, 589
F. Supp. 1494 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), appeal docketed, No. 84-6288 (2d Cir. Sept. 25, 1984)
(challenging the Secretary's abrogation of the "severity" regulations); Schisler, 107
F.R.D. 609 (challenging the Secretary's abandonment of medical improvement stan-
dard). Cf Kuehner, No. 85-1227, slip op. at 22 & n.13 (3d Cir. Dec. 9, 1985) (secrecy
argument in Schisler does not apply to all class members and therefore is not relied
upon).
101. City of New York, 742 F.2d at 738.
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causal connection between denials and procedural improprieties un-
less the Secretary publishes the procedures she had actually em-
ployed, possibly years after she had adopted them in practice. 10 2
The provision of notice also affects claimants' understanding of
the procedures to which they are entitled. Inadequacy of notice is a
grounds for equitable tolling. In employment discrimination cases,
the statute of limitations is tolled if the notice sent from the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission to the federal employee
does not state clearly that the right to sue expires in thirty days. 103
When the employing administrative agency fails to provide federal
employees with any notice of the right to sue, the limitations period
is tolled.104 Similarly, statutes of limitations in the Internal Revenue
Code are tolled when the government's notice misleads plaintiffs re-
garding the time period for filing claims.' 0 5
The issue of inadequate notice was raised in the complaint in City
of New York as an alternative theory for invalidating the Secretary's
procedures but was not reached by the district court.'0 6 Claimants
alleged that the Secretary's failure to publish her procedures in the
Federal Register violated the Administrative Procedure Act,' 0 7 the
Freedom of Information Act,' 08 and the due process clause. 10 9 The
Secretary's arguments against tolling the sixty-day rule include the
assertion that her policy was merely "an erroneous interpretation"
of the regulations which did not trigger the publication require-
ment."l0 However, because the Secretary's policy had a substantive
impact on the determination of claims for benefits, the procedure
signficantly affected the rights of claimants and therefore required
102. The alteration of the medical improvement standard provides an example of a
lag in the publication of changes in the Secretary's procedures. On August 20, 1980, the
Secretary revised her published rules to reflect her abandonment of the medical im-
provement standard and admitted that the policy was first altered on June 1, 1976. See
Kuehner, No. 85-1227, slip op. at 6-7, 22 (3d Cir. Dec. 9, 1985).
103. Martinez v. Orr, 738 F.2d 1107, 1110 (10th Cir. 1984). See Cottrell v. Newspa-
per Agency, 590 F.2d 836, 838-39 (10th Cir. 1979).
104. Williams v. Hidalgo, 663 F.2d 183, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Allen v. United States,
542 F.2d 176, 180 (3d Cir. 1976); Coles v. Penny, 531 F.2d 609, 616-17 (D.C. Cir.
1976).
105. Miller v. United States, 500 F.2d 1007, 1010-11 (2d Cir. 1974); Heath v. United
States, 219 Ct. Cl. 582, 583-84 (1979). Erroneous advice contained in notice does not
necessarily toll the statute, however. See, e.g., Union Commerce Bank v. United States,
638 F.2d 962, 963 (6th Cir. 1981).
106. Respondents' Brief in Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 25 n.18,
City of New York, cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W. 3193 (U.S. Oct. 8, 1985) (No. 84-1923).
107. 5 U.S.C. § 553.
108. 5 U.S.C. § 552.
109. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV § 1.
110. Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 28, City of New York, cert. granted, 54 U.S.L.W.





Inaccurate notice can have a devastating effect on claimants' ca-
pacity to bring procedural challenges. Unless claimants (and their
representatives) are informed of the procedures for determining
disability, they cannot challenge these procedures.'12 In these cir-
cumstances, claimants are forced to rely on the regulations, because
they have no other means of ascertaining the Secretary's proce-
dures. When the Secretary finally makes known her procedures for
determining disability, claimants should not be penalized for failing
to challenge the process sooner, even if they could have challenged
the denial or termination decisions. 11 3 Therefore, the statute of
limitations should be tolled, in City of New York and similar cases
presenting procedural challenges, until the procedural violation is
revealed.
III. Conclusion
The waiver of exhaustion analysis provided in Eldridge has enabled
courts to prevent the Secretary from utilizing illegal procedures to
deny and terminate the SSD benefits of thousands of claimants.
This valuable mechanism for protecting the interests of claimants
should not be eroded. Adherence to the objectives of the separa-
tion of powers approach in Eldridge should be continued in subse-
111. The Supreme Court has held that rules which affect "individual rights and obli-
gations" are required to be published. Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 232 (1974);
Chrysler Corp. v. Brown, 441 U.S. 281, 302 (1979). See Brown Express v. United States,
607 F.2d 695, 702 (5th Cir. 1979); Lamoille Valley R.R. v. ICC, 711 F.2d 295, 328 (D.C.
Cir. 1983); United States Dep't of Labor v. Kast Metals, 744 F.2d 1145, 1154 & n.19 (5th
Cir. 1984). But see Rivera v. Becarra, 714 F.2d 887, 891 (9th Cir. 1983), cert. denied sub
nom. International Union, United Auto., Aerospace & Agricultural Implement Workers
v. Donovan, 104 S. Ct. 1591 (1984).
112. The Social Security Act requires the Secretary to provide individual notice in-
forming each claimant of the reasons on which an unfavorable decision was based. So-
cial Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(b)(1) (1983 Amendments). By explaining in
comprehensible language the legal basis for the decision, the notice is explicitly
designed to influence the claimant's decision whether to appeal the denial of benefits.
See S.REP. No. 408, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 56-57, reprinted in 1980 U.S.CoDE CONG. &
AD. NEWS 1334-35.
113. The impact of secretive policies is greatest for claimants suffering from mental
disorders. These individuals are least able to persevere through four levels of adminis-
trative appeals to preserve the right to challenge the Secretary's procedures in court.
They "are not capable of effectively utilizing available administrative procedures without
the assistance of a representative." Mental Health Ass'n of Minnesota v. Schweiker, 554
F. Supp. 157, 167 (D. Minn. 1982), aj'd, 720 F.2d 965 (8th Cir. 1983). See City of New
York, 578 F. Supp. at 1115 ("The mentally ill are particularly vulnerable to bureaucratic
errors"); Schisler, No. 80-572 E, slip op. at 6 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 11, 1981). However, due to
the cutbacks in Legal Services appropriations and the increasing number of SSD termi-
nations, many of these claimants cannot procure legal assistance to help them challenge
denial and termination decisions. See Yohalem, supra note 2, at 998-99.
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quent procedural challenges. The rights of claimants should be
further protected by tolling the sixty-day limitation for challenges of
procedures which the Secretary has concealed. In this manner,
courts will be able to ensure that SSD claimants receive the proce-
dural protections mandated in the Constitution, statutes and
regulations.
-Rochelle Bobroff
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